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Are There Advantages to Believing in
Fate? The Belief in Negotiating With
Fate When Faced With Constraints
Evelyn W. M. Au1* and Krishna Savani2*
1 Department of Psychology, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore, 2 Culture Science Institute, Nanyang
Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Is cultural knowledge unique to a culture and inaccessible to other cultures, or is it a tool
that can be recruited by individuals outside of that culture when the situation renders
it relevant? As one test of this idea, we explored whether the applicability and benefits
of a lay belief that originated from Chinese collective wisdom extends beyond cultural
boundaries: negotiating with fate. Negotiating with fate postulates that fate imposes
boundaries within which people can shape their outcomes through their actions. This
belief contrasts fatalism, which has been traditionally interpreted as believing that
fate dictates people’s life outcomes and renders their actions largely irrelevant. We
found that the belief in negotiating with fate (but not fatalism) was strengthened when
individuals recalled instances in which they were constrained, compared to when
individuals recalled instances in which they were free to choose (Experiments 1 and
2). Subsequent studies found that after recalling a constraining event, exposure to
the belief in negotiating with fate (but not exposure to fatalism) decreased repetitive
thoughts (Experiment 3), increased the conviction that personal actions contributed to
the event (Experiment 4), increased acceptance and positive reinterpretation of the event
(Experiment 5), and increased how meaningful the event was (Experiment 6). Thus,
when faced with constraints, acknowledging fate does not necessarily lead people
to believe that their actions are irrelevant. Instead, when individuals face constraining
circumstances in which potential courses of actions are clearly limited, they are more
likely to believe that they are able to negotiate with fate, and this belief can help them
move forward from negative outcomes. We found that the belief in negotiating with
fate, although originating from Chinese folk culture, is spontaneously activated when
people experience constraints even in a non-Chinese culture, and helps people cope
with those constraints.
Keywords: negotiating with fate, agency, control, constraints, choice
INTRODUCTION
The Oxford dictionary defines a fated event as “something that happens outside of a person’s
control, regarded as pre-determined by a supernatural power.” This conceptualization of fate,
referred to as fatalism, assumes that fate has the ultimate authority over individuals’ lives
and renders personal actions irrelevant. Past research revealed that Easterners believed in
fate to a greater extent than Westerners (Cheng et al., 2013). This heightened belief in fate
among Easterners would predict lower action and agency, but the strong academic achievement
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development
[OECD], 2018) and GDP growth (World Bank, 2018) in many
Asian countries are somewhat inconsistent with this idea.
To address this issue, recent research (Au et al., 2011, 2012,
2017) introduced an alternative perspective on fate: negotiating
with fate. In contrast to fatalism’s assumption that people’s life
outcomes are fixed and pre-determined, negotiating with fate
postulates that fate imposes boundaries within which people
can shape their outcomes through their actions. In other words,
according to this belief, fate imposes constraints within which
individuals must work (e.g., socio-cultural environments,
socio-economic status, uncontrollable life events), but how
individuals exercise agency within the boundaries of the
constraints ultimately determines individuals’ life course. From
this perspective, negotiating with fate prescribes specific roles
for fate and personal control. In fact, we may routinely act
consistently with the idea of negotiating with fate without
realizing it. For example, when we open the fridge at the end of
a long day to make dinner, we may decide to use the ingredients
that we have available to make the best dinner possible, rather
than to go to the supermarket and buy ingredients to make
the specific dish that we are craving. Thus, in this situation, we
are actively working with the constraints that we face (i.e., the
ingredients that we have available) to achieve a desired goal (i.e.,
making a good dinner). The belief in negotiating with fate was
identified by examining Chinese and American idioms (Au,
2008; Chiu et al., 2012). In both cultures, proverbs reflected three
fate beliefs: (1) personal control (i.e., individuals’ actions solely
determined outcomes and fate does not play a role; “You are the
master of your fate”); (2) fatalism (i.e., fate determines outcomes,
which cannot be altered by personal actions; “You will meet
your fate on the road you took to avoid it”); and (3) negotiating
with fate (i.e., fate imposes boundaries within which personal
actions can shape outcomes; “When fate gives you lemons, make
lemonade”). Here, we used an American idiom to illustrate the
idea of negotiable fate, but a cross-cultural comparison revealed
that Chinese proverbs are much more likely than American
proverbs to capture the belief in negotiating with fate.
Given the origins of negotiating with fate, questions about its
utility beyond the Chinese context may arise. Following Chiu and
Hong’s (2005) approach to cultural knowledge, we argue for its
pan-cultural applicability. Chiu and Hong (2005) likened cultural
knowledge to tools: knowledge that helps the group adapt to the
environmental challenges faced gains popularity; knowledge that
is no longer perceived as useful in the current environmental
context fades into obscurity. From this perspective, cultural
knowledge is not unique to a culture and inaccessible to other
cultures per se, but is a tool that can be recruited by individuals
outside of that culture when the situation renders it relevant.
Context-Specific Advantages of
Negotiating With Fate
Au et al. (2011, 2012, 2017) proposed that the prevalence and
consequences of different fate beliefs depended on the socio-
ecology of the environment within which individuals function.
More specifically, negotiating with fate was postulated as being
particularly popular and beneficial when individuals must
contend with external factors to determine outcomes. Au et al.
(2012) examined the role of constraints on the consequences of
negotiable fate, operationalizing constraints as acknowledging
that there were aspects of the external world that cannot be
changed through personal actions.
The cross-cultural results from Au et al. (2012) replicated
past findings on perceived constraints (Su et al., 1999): Chinese
participants perceived greater external constraints than their
American counterparts. In Su et al.’s (1999) chapter, a study
was reported in which Chinese participants subscribed to a
stronger entity belief of the world (i.e., viewed the world as
inherently static and unchangeable), but subscribed a stronger
incremental theory of the self (i.e., viewed individuals to be more
malleable), presumably because individuals need to change in
response to the unchangeable external constraints. Furthermore,
Chinese participants endorsed negotiating with fate to a greater
extent than their American counterparts. Importantly, perceived
constraints mediated the cultural difference in negotiating with
fate, suggesting that constraints play a critical role in fostering the
belief that individuals can change outcomes by working within
boundaries imposed by fate. Lastly, the context-specific benefits
of negotiating with fate were also evident: among those who
perceived relatively greater constraints (i.e., the Chinese sample)
negotiating with fate was positively associated with the greater use
of active coping strategies and higher self-esteem; whereas among
those who faced relatively fewer constraints (i.e., in the American
sample), the same belief was associated with the greater use of
avoidant coping strategies and lower self-esteem.
To test Chiu and Hong’s (2005) theory that cultural knowledge
is flexibly recruited and applied in response to the environment,
we examined whether the need to contend with constraints can
cultivate the belief in negotiating with fate beyond the Chinese
cultural context. If the results support their theory, we should be
able to observe a similar pattern of results in a population that
does not ordinarily believe that one can negotiate fate nor benefit
from this belief.
Strengthening the Endorsement of
Negotiating With Fate and Its Associated
Advantages
The current set of studies addressed two research questions.
First, if the belief in negotiating with fate is part of a cognitive
toolbox that individuals flexibly use in response to the situation,
can the experience of constraints strengthen the belief that one
can negotiate with fate, even among US American participants?
Although Americans did not explicitly endorse the belief in fate
(Leung et al., 2002, 2012), social psychologists have found that
Americans were reluctant to tempt fate (Risen and Gilovich,
2008), and recruited fate as an explanation for past events when
asked to think about “why” the event happened (Burrus and
Roese, 2006). Therefore, we predicted that Americans’ belief
in negotiating with fate will be stronger when they are faced
with constraining circumstances (the activation hypothesis). We
sought to capture the experience of facing daily constraints by
operationalizing constraints as the lack of choices. Constraints
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and lack of choices have been found to be analogous, given
research indicating that people experience the availability of
choices as the lack of constraints (i.e., freedom) and the non-
availability of choices as the presence of constraints (Schwartz
et al., 2002; Savani et al., 2010). Thus, Studies 1 and 2 first
activated a constraint (i.e., limitations on possible actions) vs. a
choice (i.e., no limitations on possible actions) mindset (Savani
and Rattan, 2012), and then assessed participants’ endorsement
to negotiate with fate.
Second, among US American participants who do not
generally believe strongly in negotiating with fate (Au et al.,
2012), can exposure to the concept of negotiating with fate retain
its advantages when they must contend with constraints? Au
et al. (2012) found that the belief that one can negotiate with
fate was not adaptive for Americans—those with stronger beliefs
in negotiating with fate were more likely to use avoidant coping
styles and had lower self-esteem. This is likely because unlike
the Chinese, Americans face fewer constraints in their everyday
lives. However, when the circumstances require Americans to
navigate constraints, will the belief that one can negotiate with
fate help them cope in a more positive manner? We expected that
the answer to be yes (the context-specific advantages hypothesis).
Thus, Studies 3–6 utilized a belief activation paradigm (adapted
from Rattan et al., 2012) to explore whether activating the
concept of negotiating with fate (vs. personal control or fatalism)
affected various outcomes that indicate constructive ways of
managing constraints: appreciating the impact of personal
actions, ruminating less, viewing the event through more positive
lenses, and finding meaning.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 tested the activation hypothesis by asking people to
recall instances in which they made choices, in which they had
to do something without any choice (i.e., constraints condition),
or in which they just did something (a neutral condition with no
reference to choice or the lack thereof). If we only included the
two conditions in which participants recalled situations of choice
vs. situations of constraints, we would be unable to establish
whether changes in participants’ beliefs were driven by activating
a choice mindset or by activating a constraints mindset. Given
that our hypotheses specified the effects of activating a constraints
mindset on negotiating with fate, we needed to include a neutral
condition to test this effect. Participants then completed measures
assessing the three types of beliefs identified by Chiu et al. (2012)
analysis of Chinese and US American idioms: personal control,
fatalism, and negotiating with fate. We predicted that recalling
situations of constraint, rather than situations of choice, would
strengthen people’s belief in negotiating with fate. We further
expected that recalling situations of choice would strengthen
people’s belief in personal control because the experience of
recalling ways in which they were able to determine their
own course of action should increase their belief that their
actions determine personal outcomes. We did not expect that
recalling situations of constraints would heighten people’s belief
in fatalism compared to situations of choice. The rationale was
that in situations of constraints, individuals are limited in what
they could do, but their actions can still make a difference to
their outcomes. Past research has found that experiencing lack of
action-outcome contingency increases fatalism (Lefcourt, 1981,
1982), but we did not examine such extreme constraints. Under
more everyday constraints (e.g., having to find an alternate way
to get to work because one’s car broke down), individuals still
had a chance to exercise personal control within the confines of
the constraints.
Method
Participants
A heterogeneous sample of 121 United States residents
(representing different religions and levels of educational
attainment; see Table 1 for demographics information) was
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.1 Participants who
1According to Gervais et al. (2015), the average effect size in psychology is d = 0.40.
With this average size, N = 100 is required to achieve 80% power with alpha = 0.05.
Thus, the target sample size for Experiment 1 was 100 participants per cell.
A survey seeking 300 United States residents was posted on www.mturk.com,
TABLE 1 | Demographic information for all six samples.
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 Study 6
Age
Mean 35.9 30.2 33.6 33.5 29.3 35.0
Standard
Deviation
11.9 8.9 10.8 11.8 8.7 12.9
Range 19–66 18–65 19–67 18–71 18–61 18–71
Gender
Men 62 111 97 48 127 72
Women 59 89 120 90 67 86
Educational attainment
Did not
complete high
school
1 1 1 2 1 2
Completed
high school
18 18 26 14 18 14
Incomplete
college degree
26 54 56 42 59 52
Associate’s
degree
14 27 27 18 28 12
Bachelor’s
degree
46 72 81 46 73 59
Master’s
degree
12 21 22 15 11 16
Doctoral
degree
4 5 4 2 3 2
Unreported 0 2 0 0 1 1
Religious affiliation (n)
Non-religious 56 114 130 68 117 75
Protestant 25 27 21 22 25 27
Catholic 16 23 32 21 27 23
Christian 13 21 22 17 18 21
Other religions 11 15 12 10 6 12
Unreported 0 0 0 0 1 0
Frequencies are reported for gender, educational attainment and religious affiliation.
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had taken part in any one experiment were excluded from
participating in any subsequent experiments. Participants were
randomly assigned to either the choice condition, the no-choice
condition, or the neutral condition.
Manipulation
To manipulate the salience of choice versus constraints, we
adapted the manipulation used by Savani and Rattan (2012,
Study 1). Participants completed a recall task about the four time
periods: previous morning (8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.), afternoon
(12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.), evening (4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.),
and night (8:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m.). In the neutral condition,
participants were asked to list five things they did during
these four time periods; in the choice condition, participants
were asked to list five choices they made (Savani and Rattan,
2012); and in the no choice condition, participants were asked
to list five things that they did not have a choice but to do.
The ease of recall might differ across conditions, and because
the ease of recall might be associated with a greater sense
of control, we asked participants the ease of completing the
recall task, using a scale from 1 (extremely difficult) to 7
(extremely easy).
Dependent Measures
After the manipulation, participants completed three fate beliefs
measures: personal control, fatalism, and negotiating with fate.
and 208 participants completed the study by the time the study expired. In all
six experiments, we identified non-attentive participants with the same three
checks. First, we used an instructions check before random assignment to identify
participants who tend not to read instructions (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Second,
at the end of the experiment, we asked participants if they were eating or drinking
during the survey (binary forced-choice question) and thus were likely to be
distracted. Third, we administered a multiple-choice memory test about the task
that they completed in the manipulation, again to identify participants who were
not paying attention during the survey. Forty-four participants were excluded
for failing the instructions check, 27 participants were excluded for failing the
distractors check, and 16 were excluded for failing the memory check. These
criteria and extent of exclusions are typical for online samples (e.g., Hardisty and
Weber, 2009). Conducting research online offers the advantage of much more
diverse samples but has the disadvantage of the lack of control over the amount
of distraction experienced by participants during the survey. Excluding data from
the inattentive participants increases statistical power (e.g., Maniaci and Rogge,
2014; Oppenheimer et al., 2009) without changing the direction of the underlying
effects.
TABLE 3 | Correlations between fate beliefs, split by condition for Studies 1 and 2.
Study 1 Study 2
Personal Personal
Fatalism control Fatalism control
Choice
Negotiating
with fate
−0.46∗∗ 0.60∗∗ Negotiating
with fate
−0.31∗ 0.20
Fatalism – −0.49∗ Fatalism – −0.39∗∗
Neutral
Negotiating
with fate
−0.06 0.53∗∗ Negotiating
with fate
−0.15 0.26∗
Fatalism – −0.56∗∗ Fatalism – −0.18
No Choice
Negotiating
with fate
0.12 0.43∗∗ Negotiating
with fate
−0.27∗ 0.44∗∗
Fatalism – −0.40∗ Fatalism −0.33∗∗
∗∗p < 0.01 and ∗p < 0.05.
To capture the belief in personal control (i.e., individuals’ actions
solely determined outcomes and fate does not play a role), we
used the internal locus of control measure (8 items; Levenson,
1981; sample item: “My life is determined by my own actions.”);
to capture the belief in fatalism (i.e., fate dictates outcomes
and personal actions do not have an impact), we used the
chance locus of control measure (8 items; Levenson, 1981; sample
item: “I have often found that what is going to happen will
happen.”); to capture negotiating with fate, we used a revised
the negotiating with fate measure that focuses more strongly
on navigating boundaries imposed by fate (10 items; sample
item: “I cannot change what fate has given me, but I can still
achieve my dreams if I put in the effort.” See Appendix A).
Participants indicated the extent of their agreement on a scale
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Items from all
three scales were completely randomized for each participant and
presented on one page.
Results
We averaged the items for each belief (8 items, αPersonalControl =
0.79; 8 items, αFatalism = 0.84; 10 items, αNegotiatingWithFate = 0.86).
TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for the three lay beliefs about personal control and fate in Experiments 1 and 2.
Choice Neutral No choice
95% Confidence 95% Confidence 95% Confidence
Mean S.D. interval Mean S.D. interval Mean S.D interval
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Study 1
Personal control 4.57 0.62 4.36 4.77 4.46 0.73 4.25 4.66 4.40 0.57 4.20 4.61
Fatalism 2.97 0.83 2.70 3.24 3.26 0.89 3.01 3.52 3.43 0.69 3.18 3.67
Negotiating with fate 4.47 0.61 4.28 4.67 4.41 0.64 4.23 4.60 4.72 0.45 4.56 4.88
Study 2
Personal Control 4.00 0.55 3.86 4.13 4.00 0.58 3.86 4.14 4.14 0.54 4.01 4.28
Fatalism 2.89 0.67 2.72 3.06 2.98 0.64 2.83 3.14 2.88 0.75 2.69 3.06
Negotiating with Fate 4.90 0.54 4.77 5.03 4.90 0.53 4.77 5.03 5.05 0.55 4.92 5.19
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The means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals are
presented in Table 2, and the correlations between the fate beliefs
for each condition are presented in Table 3. We found significant
differences between conditions in the ease of the recall task used
in the manipulation, F(2,117) = 10.19, p < 0.01 (MNeutral = 5.88;
MChoice = 5.15; MNoChoice = 4.34, with higher numbers indicating
greater ease), and thus, we included ease of recall as a covariate
in all analyses.
Our hypothesis was that the belief in negotiating with
fate (but not belief in personal control or fatalism) would
be higher in the no-choice condition compared with either
the choice or neutral conditions. Given that we had specific
hypotheses about how the dependent measures would vary
across conditions, regressions testing those specific hypotheses
have been recommended over conducting omnibus ANOVAs
before conducting post hoc comparisons (Rosnow and Rosenthal,
1996; Abelson and Prentice, 1997). Thus, for each belief, we
conducted one regression analysis to examine the effects of
the no-choice constraints condition vis-à-vis the neutral and
choice conditions. To this end, we entered two dummy variables
identifying participants in the neutral and choice conditions, with
the no-choice condition serving as the reference/comparison
group. Note that a negative regression coefficient for either
variable indicates that scores in that condition were lower than
scores in the no-choice condition.
The belief in personal control did not differ between the
neutral and no-choice conditions [B = −0.08, SE = 0.16,
t(117) = 0.49, p = 0.63], or between the choice and no-choice
conditions [B = 0.10, SE = 0.16; t(117) = 0.64, p = 0.52]. The
belief in fatalism was weaker in the choice condition than in
the no-choice condition [B = −0.40, SE = 0.19, t(117) = 1.98,
p = 0.05, d = 0.60], but did not differ between the neutral and
no-choice conditions [B = −0.049, SE = 0.20; t(117) = 0.25,
p = 0.81]. Most importantly, the belief in negotiating with fate
was stronger in the no-choice condition than in either the neutral
[B = −0.34, SE = 0.14, t(117) = 2.53, p = 0.01, d = 0.58] or
choice [B = −0.49, SE = 0.14, t(117) = 3.64, p < 0.001, d = 0.46]
conditions (see Figure 1).
Discussion
Experiment 1 supported our key hypothesis that, compared to
situations in which people have freedom and choice, constraining
situations (i.e., no choice) activated the belief that individuals can
shape outcomes within the confines of the circumstances (i.e.,
1
2
3
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6
7
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Choice
condition
Neutral
condition
No
choice
condition
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n 
ag
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FIGURE 1 | Mean agreement with lay theories about fate in Experiment 1, by
condition. Error bars refer to standard errors of the means.
negotiating with fate). Notably, constraining situations did not
reduce people’s belief in personal control, indicating that even
when they do not have choice, people were motivated to perceive
that their actions determine outcomes. Predictably, constraining
situations increased people’s belief in fatalism compared to the
choice condition, but there were no differences in fatalism
between the no choice condition and the neutral condition. In
sum, Experiment 1 shows that the belief in negotiating with fate
was spontaneously strengthened in situations of constraint.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication of Experiment
1 while making the three control scales more comparable. The
items for fatalism and personal control used in Experiment 1
measured beliefs about the role of fate (vs. personal control)
for domain-specific outcomes (e.g., getting involved in a car
accident) and non-domain specific outcomes (e.g., having
control over one’s life); whereas, the items for the belief in
negotiating with fate included primarily non-domain specific
outcomes. This difference may make comparisons between scales
potentially problematic. To remove this possible confound, we
created a novel measure that simultaneously assessed all three
constructs (i.e., personal control, fatalism and negotiating with
fate) in parallel, using non-domain specific rather than domain-
specific outcomes.
Method
Participants
A sample of 200 United States. residents (see Table 1
for demographics information) was recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.2 Participants were randomly assigned to
either the choice condition, the no-choice condition, or the
neutral condition.
Procedure
Participants completed the same experimental manipulation as
in Experiment 1, and then completed a novel measure with 7 sets
of items (see Appendix B). Each set included a stem followed by
three completing clauses that assessed fatalism, personal control
and negotiating with fate. A sample set included the stem: “When
individuals face a setback when pursuing a goal, they should
believe that. . .” Participants were then asked to rate the extent
to which they agree with each of the following: “. . .there’s only
so much they can do to attain their goals” (fatalism), “. . .there’s
nothing they cannot achieve” (personal control), and “. . .they can
still attain their goals if they work with the current constraints”
(negotiating with fate). Participants rated their agreement on a
scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). The seven
2The target sample size for Experiment 2 was also 100 participants per cell.
A survey seeking 300 United States residents was posted on www.mturk.com, and
302 participants completed the study before it expired. Non-attentive participants
were identified using the same criteria described in Experiment 1. Fifty-five
participants were excluded for failing the instructions check, 37 participants were
excluded for eating or drinking, and 10 were excluded for failing the memory
check.
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sets, and the three clauses representing each fate belief within
each set, were presented in a random order to each participant.
Results
We averaged the seven items for each belief
(αPersonalControl = 0.52; αFatalism = 0.73; αNegotiatingWithFate = 0.81).
The means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals are
presented in Table 2, and the correlations between the fate beliefs
for each condition are presented in Table 3. As in Experiment
1, there were significant differences between conditions in the
ease of the recall task used in the manipulation, F(2,197) = 40.60,
p < 0.01 (MNeutral = 5.82; MChoice = 4.75; MNoChoice = 3.51),
and thus, we included ease of recall as a covariate in all analyses.
Two participants who did not answer the recall difficulty
question were excluded from the following analysis, giving a
total sample of 198.
For each fate belief, we conducted a regression analysis to test
whether that particular belief was different in the choice condition
and the neutral condition compared to the no choice condition,
which was treated as the reference group. Fatalism beliefs did not
differ between the neutral and no-choice conditions [B = 0.15,
SE = 0.14, t(194) = 1.07, p = 0.29], or between the choice
and no-choice conditions [B = 0.04, SE = 0.13, t(194) = 0.29,
p = 0.77]. Similarly, personal control beliefs did not differ between
the neutral and no-choice conditions [B = −0.19, SE = 0.12,
t(194) = −1.63, p = 0.10], or between the choice and no-
choice conditions [B = −0.17, SE = 0.10, t(194) = −1.61,
p = 0.11]. However, the belief in negotiating with fate was
stronger in the no-choice condition than in either the neutral
[B = −0.24, SE = 0.11, t(194) = 2.18, p = 0.03, d = 0.29] or
choice [B = −0.20, SE = 0.09, t(194) = 2.02, p = 0.04, d = 0.29]
conditions (see Figure 2). This result replicates the finding
from Experiment 1.
Discussion
Using a more comparable measure of the three fate beliefs,
Experiment 2 conceptually replicated the key finding of
Experiment 1. Measuring the three fate beliefs at the same
level of specificity and in parallel, Experiment 2 found that
recalling in which they did not have choices (i.e., constraining
situations) strengthened participants’ belief in negotiating with
fate (but not their belief in personal control or fatalism). Taken
together, findings from Experiments 1 and 2 provided support for
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FIGURE 2 | Mean agreement with lay theories about fate in Experiment 2, by
condition. Error bars refer to standard errors of the means.
the activation hypothesis: in constraining situations, individuals
expressed a stronger endorsement of negotiating with fate.
EXPERIMENTS 3–6
Experiments 3 to 6 were designed to test whether the belief
in negotiating with fate has context-specific advantages. That
is, does activating the concept of negotiating with fate help
people manage constraining situations? Thus, similar to the
manipulation used in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were
asked to recall a situation in their past that they had no choice
but to face. We were interested in seeing how individuals respond
in the present to past events for two reasons. First, individuals
do “replay/relive” past life events over time to make sense of
them (McAdams, 2005), and thus, how individuals come to
see such events and how they cope with them evolve. Second,
past research has shown how one’s current perspective on the
past shapes their recollection of the past (Ross, 1989). Thus,
we proposed that being able to change individuals’ present
perspective on past events could help individuals cope with the
event differently in the future.
To activate the beliefs in personal control, fatalism and
negotiating with fate, we experimentally induced using a biased
questionnaire method (Salancik, 1974). Although such beliefs
are typically treated as individual differences, past research has
shown that a number of beliefs simultaneously act as trait and
state variables, and can be temporarily activated (Chiu et al., 1997;
Rattan et al., 2012). Given the stronger causal claims that can
be drawn from experiments, we manipulated whether a belief in
personal control, fatalism, or negotiating with fate was salient.
To investigate the effects of the belief in negotiating with
fate on people’s ability to move forward from a constraining
event, we included a wide range of measures to evaluate the
benefits of the belief. The goal of Experiment 3 was to test
whether activating negotiating with fate would lead individuals
to embrace its fatalistic component. Given that fatalism can
hinder individuals’ ability to move forward from the event,
Experiment 3 investigated the impact of a heightened belief
in negotiating with fate on rumination. Rumination involves
repeatedly mulling over the past event rather than thinking of
how to avoid a similar occurrence in the future or how to
manage the situation now that the event has occurred (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). In developing Experiments 4–6, we
reasoned that even if we found that activating negotiating
with fate decreased rumination, it is still unclear whether
negotiating with fate fostered adaptive coping. More specifically,
we cannot take the absence of rumination as implying the
presence of coping strategies that would help individuals move
forward from the event. Thus, Experiment 4 investigated
negotiating with fate helped individuals identify their behaviors
as having contributed to the event. If yes, this would suggest
that individuals believed that they could potentially avoid a
similar occurrence in the future by changing their behaviors
rather than simply mulling over the event. These results
would also imply that individuals did not view such events
as inevitable, thereby providing additional support for the
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contention that negotiating with fate does not enhance people’s
belief in fatalism.
Whereas Experiment 4 investigated people’s perceptions
of how to potentially avoid a similar event in the future,
Experiments 5 and 6 investigated how negotiating with fate
helped individuals move forward now that the event has
happened and cannot be changed. In Experiment 5, we examined
whether negotiating with fate increases positive reinterpretation
and acceptance of the event (but not denial or mental
disengagement), and in Experiment 6, negotiating with fate
increases a sense of meaning in the event after generating a silver
lining, seeing the event as shaping who they are now.
By specifying the specific roles of fate and personal control, we
expected negotiating with fate to provide context-specific benefits
that are not afforded by personal control and fatalism. We
reasoned that negotiating with fate highlights how individuals’
actions can still make a difference even when they face
constraining circumstances that their actions cannot change.
Thus, when individuals think of such situations, we predicted that
negotiating with fate would decrease unproductive rumination
(Experiment 3), and help them identify ways in which their
actions contributed to an event (Experiment 4). Furthermore,
by focusing on how to make the best of a constraining
situation, we expected negotiating with fate to foster greater
positive interpretation and acceptance of the event (but not
denial and mental disengagement; Experiment 5). Lastly, we
hypothesized that negotiating with fate helps people integrate the
constraining event into their identities, after they search for a
silver lining (Experiment 6).
EXPERIMENT 3
The primary goal of Experiment 3 was to test whether exposure to
negotiating with fate paralyzed individuals from moving forward
after a constraining event. Rumination refers to self-focused
and repetitive attention on one’s negative mood in response to
the past event (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 1999). Thus, rather than thinking about how they could
potentially avoid a similar event in the future or how to manage
the situation now that it has happened, individuals who ruminate
repeatedly ask themselves questions such as, “What did I do
to deserve this?” “Why can’t I handle things better?” “Why
can’t I snap out of this?” Reported rumination levels were
positively associated with stress levels and depressive symptoms
after a multitude of experiences that individuals had no choice
but to face (e.g., a natural disaster and after cancer surgery;
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991; Yu et al., 2008). Given
these findings, we investigated how activating negotiating with
fate (vis-à-vis personal control and fatalism) would influence
rumination levels.
We expected activating fatalism to increase rumination
levels because past research has shown that perceiving an
inability to direct important life events was associated with
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Based on this
logic, activating the belief in personal control should lower
rumination levels as it highlights the extent to which outcomes
are determined by personal actions. However, the hypothesis
was less straightforward: while some findings have shown that
perceived control is associated with lowered rumination as
suggested by the work of Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues,
others have found the reverse, specifically for events that the
individual had no choice but to face (Meadows, 1989; Flett
et al., 1991). Thus, contending with constraining situations
may also be challenging for those exposed to the belief in
personal control because such situations are at odds with the
activated lay belief about fate. Given that studies on events that
individuals had no choice but to face showed that personal
control was associated with poorer reactions, we expected that
activating personal control will also be associated with reports of
greater rumination.
Importantly, we predicted that activating the belief in
negotiating with fate will be associated with the lowest levels
of rumination. Findings from previous research suggested that
the belief in negotiating with fate provided individuals with a
broader attributional framework for making sense of unexpected
negative events, allowing them to register lower levels of surprise
in response (Au et al., 2011; Study 1). Thus, we hypothesized that
exposure to negotiate with fate will provide a similar context-
specific benefit: help individuals move on from constraining
events by lowering levels of rumination.
Method
Participants
A sample of 217 United States residents (see Table 1
for demographics information) was recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.3
Event Recall
Similar to the no choice condition in Experiments 1 and 2, all
participants were asked to recall an event from that they had no
choice but to face, and to spend 5 min describing this event, and
asked to spend 5 min describing this event. Participants recalled
events such as experiencing financial difficulties, getting divorced,
having health problems, and being involved in traffic accidents.
Manipulation
Upon completing the event recall task, we implemented
the experimental manipulation using a biased questionnaire
method (Salancik, 1974). Participants were randomly exposed
to complete a scale that activated either the belief in personal
control, fatalism, or negotiating with fate. The biased items
were adapted from the measures used in Experiment 1 (see
Appendix C). Examples of the biased questionnaires include,
“For the most part, people’s lives are determined by their own
3The target sample size for Experiment 3 was also 100 participants per cell.
A survey seeking 300 United States residents was posted on www.mturk.com,
and 302 participants completed the study before it expired. Non-attentive
participants were identified using the same criteria described in the previous
three experiments. Fifty-four participants were excluded for failing the instructions
check, 27 participants were excluded for eating or drinking, and 3 were excluded
for failing the memory check. One participant was excluded for not completing
the experimental manipulation. Due to a programming error, participants were
not asked when the event occurred, and thus we could not exclude participants
who recalled an event more than a decade old.
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actions” (αPersonalControl = 0.83), “Occasionally, there are times
that whatever is going to happen will happen – whether good or
bad.” (αFatalism = 0.84), and “As long as people focus on making
the best out of a bad situation, it doesn’t really matter what fate
throws at you.” (αNegotiatingWithFate = 0.92). The response scale
accompanying the items was biased in that it included many
more “agree” options than “disagree” options, thus encouraging
participants to agree with the items presented: 1 = do not agree,
2 = slightly agree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = moderately agree, and
5 = strongly agree (Rattan et al., 2012).
Dependent Measure
To measure the extent to which participants ruminated about the
stressful event that they recalled, we used the 22-item Ruminative
Responses Style scale (Treynor et al., 2003). As the original scale
captured individual differences in rumination, the instructions
were adapted slightly to ask participants the extent to which
they ruminated about the recalled event (sample item: “I think
about “what did I do to deserve this”?”) Participants rated the
frequency of their responses on a 4-point scale with 1 = almost
never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = almost always.
Results
In this study, we did not find any significant difference
in mean agreement with the biased response scale across
conditions [MFatalism = 3.64, MPersonalControl = 3.42,
MNegotiatingWithFate = 3.55; F(2, 214) = 1.45, p = 0.24]. Yet,
given that group differences in agreement were observed in the
subsequent experiments, we included participants’ agreement
to be biased scale as a covariate (as did Rattan et al., 2012, who
used a similar paradigm) to address the concern that the results
may be an artifact of greater agreement to certain beliefs rather
than consequences of merely being exposed to different beliefs.
To maintain consistency with Experiments 4–6, we controlled
for participants’ agreement to the biased response scales in all
analyses in this experiment as well.
We averaged the 22 items in the rumination scale (α = 0.93).
The means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals
of the dependent variable are presented in Table 4. We then
ran a regression testing whether rumination levels were different
in the fatalism and personal control condition compared to
the negotiating with fate condition, which was treated as
the reference group. The results supported our hypothesis:
activating negotiating with fate decreased rumination compared
to activating fatalism [B = 0.22, SE = 0.09; t(213) = 2.25,
p = 0.03, d = 0.38]. There was no significant difference between
activating negotiating with fate and personal control [B = 0.08,
SE = 0.09; t(213) = 0.87, p = 0.39, d = 0.15]. To compare the
effects of activating personal control against fatalism, we excluded
participants in the negotiating with fate group. Using the same
regression equation, the results indicated that activating personal
control did not lead to lower levels of rumination compared to
activating fatalism [B =−0.13, SE = 0.10; t(143) =−1.31, p = 0.19,
d = 0.23; see Figure 3].
Discussion
Consistent with our hypotheses, Experiment 3 showed that
activating the belief in negotiating with fate led to less rumination
about a constraining event, compared to activating fatalism. The
results also revealed that the rumination levels after activating
personal control did not differ from either activating fatalism
or negotiating with fate. Given the non-significant difference
in reported rumination between the personal control and
fatalism conditions, it appeared that using a set of explanatory
factors that include both internal and external factors assisted
individuals in reducing their repetitive thoughts about the
constraining event more than the explanatory sets that involved
either fatalism or personal control alone. Although lowered
levels of rumination suggested that individuals were no longer
dwelling on the event unconstructively, it would also be
important to demonstrate that negotiating with fate also helped
individuals actively move forward by assessing the extent to
TABLE 4 | Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for Experiments 3–6.
Personal Control Fatalism Negotiating with Fate
95% Confidence 95% Confidence 95% Confidence
Mean S.D. interval Mean S.D. interval Mean S.D interval
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Study 3
Rumination 1.89 0.59 1.75 2.02 2.02 0.61 1.88 2.17 1.80 0.56 1.67 1.93
Study 4
Identifying own behavior
as a contributing factor
3.33 1.12 3.03 3.68 3.43 0.97 3.14 3.72 3.87 1.17 3.52 4.22
Study 5
Positive reappraisal 2.63 0.78 2.45 2.84 2.57 0.76 2.38 2.76 2.80 0.76 2.60 2.98
Acceptance 3.37 0.63 3.21 3.53 3.22 0.66 3.05 3.38 3.30 0.69 3.11 3.46
Denial 1.43 0.56 1.29 1.57 1.30 0.43 1.19 1.40 1.38 0.54 1.24 1.51
Behavioral disengagement 2.05 0.65 1.89 2.22 2.02 0.59 1.88 2.17 1.98 0.62 1.83 2.14
Study 6
Meaning 4.09 1.42 3.71 4.47 4.04 1.48 3.61 4.46 4.55 1.60 4.10 4.99
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FIGURE 3 | Mean rumination about constraining event in Experiment 4, by
condition. Error bars refer to standard errors of the means.
which they were able to accept and reinterpret the event in a
more positive light.
EXPERIMENT 4
The primary goal of Experiment 3 was to show that activating
negotiating with fate did not lead individuals to embrace a
fatalistic way of thinking, as evidenced by lowered rumination
levels. However, it was still unclear whether negotiating with fate
fosters adaptive coping. More specifically, we cannot take the
absence of rumination as implying the presence of maintaining
faith that their personal actions could make a difference in
altering events. Thus, in Experiment 4, we explored the impact
of negotiating with fate on identifying personal actions as
contributing to the constraining event. If negotiating with
fate led individuals to more readily rate their behaviors as
contributing to the event, we would be able to draw two
conclusions. First, by identifying their personal actions as
contributing to the event, individuals also gained information
about how they could potentially avoid a similar event in
the future. This would show that negotiating with fate not
only lowered individuals’ tendencies to mull repetitively over
the event (Experiment 3), it also helped them move forward.
Second, by identifying personal actions as a contributing factor
to the event, individuals rejected the notion that the event
was inevitable. Such a finding would provide further evidence
that exposure to negotiating with fate did not enhance their
beliefs in fate.
Past research has shown that believing that negotiating with
fate helped individuals identify ways to make the use of available
resources (Au et al., 2017), and thus, we argued that activating this
belief would help individuals focus on aspects of a constraining
situation that can be changed through actions (Au et al., 2012),
such as their behaviors. Identifying ways in which personal
actions contributed to the situation may provide basis for
avoiding a similar occurrence in the future (Janoff-Bulman, 1979;
Anderson and Riger, 1991), and rejects the notion that the
outcome was inevitable (Roese, 1997). From this perspective,
even if the cause was external, we proposed that believing that
one can negotiate with fate would lead individuals to identify
ways in which their actions could have potentially altered event’s
occurrence (Mandel and Lehman, 1996).
In contrast, we expected neither the activation of the belief
in personal control nor fatalism to increase perceptions that
personal behaviors contributed to constraining events. Past
research has shown that stronger beliefs in personal control were
associated with a defensive reaction (i.e., thinking about how
the outcome could have been worse; Kismatis and Wells, 2014),
thus, reducing the role of behaviors in altering the situation.
Similarly, a belief in fate strengthened perceived the inevitability
of an event (Burrus and Roese, 2006), thus also rendering
behaviors irrelevant. We proposed that negotiating with fate will
help individuals focus on changeable aspects that contributed
to the situation, rather than simply viewing more factors as
contributing to constraining events. Thus, we explored an aspect
of the individual that was viewed as relatively stable among North
Americans (Su et al., 1999): one’s character. We expected that
activating negotiable fate will increase ratings of behaviors (but
not ratings of one’s character) as a contributing factor to the event.
Methods
Participants
A sample of 139 United States residents (see Table 1
for demographics information) was recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.4
Event Recall
Participants were all asked to recall an event from their life
that they had no choice but to face. To ensure that participants
spend some time thinking about the event, we also asked them
to think about ways they could have anticipated the course
of the events and ways in which they could prevent a similar
event from occurring in the future. Similar to Experiment
3, participants described events such as experiencing financial
difficulties, relationship problems (e.g., infidelity and divorce),
health problems, and car accidents.
Manipulation
Upon completing the recall task, we implemented the
experimental manipulation using the same biased questionnaire
method as in Experiment 3. Participants were randomly exposed
to a scale that activated one of the three beliefs (αFatalism = 0.82;
αPersonalControl = 0.81; αNegotiatingWithFate = 0.94).
Dependent Measure
We then asked participants to identify why the event happened,
and the two types of potential factors were presented in a
randomized order (Meyer and Taylor, 1986). The behavior scale
4The target sample size for Experiment 4 was also 100 participants per cell.
A survey seeking 300 United States residents was posted on www.mturk.com, and
308 participants completed the study before it expired. Non-attentive participants
were identified using the same criteria described in Experiments 1 and 2. Sixty-
two participants were excluded for failing the instructions check, 29 participants
were excluded for eating or drinking, and 54 were excluded for failing the memory
check. As past research has demonstrated individuals’ coping strategies in response
to a negative situation remains relatively stable between the event and up to
a decade (Pollard and Kennedy, 2007), only participants who listed an event
that occurred within the last 10 years was included in the sample and analyses.
Twenty-four participants were excluded from the sample as the event they recalled
occurred more than 10 years ago, and one participant did not report the year when
the event occurred.
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consisted of four items, including, “I was too impulsive” and
“I should have been more cautious” (α = 0.70).5 The character
scale also consisted of four items, including, “I can’t take care
of myself ” and “I have bad luck” (α = 0.44). Participants were
asked whether they agreed that each was a contributory factor on
a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). Given
the low internal reliability of the character subscale, we did not
analyze the data for this dependent measure.
Results
Consistent with Rattan et al. (2012), we tested if there is
a difference in the mean agreement with the biased scales
differed across conditions. We found a marginal difference
in participants’ mean agreement with the biased scale
across conditions [MFatalism = 3.54, MPersonalControl = 3.67,
MNegotiatingWithFate = 3.90; F(2,136) = 2.89, p = 0.06]. Thus, we
included participants’ agreement to be biased scale as a covariate
(as did Rattan et al., 2012, who used a similar paradigm).
To compute the dependent measure, we averaged the four
items in the behaviors (i.e., changeable factors) dependent
variable. The means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence
intervals of the dependent variable are presented in Table 4. We
ran a regression to test whether the identification of behavior as
a contributing factor differed between the fatalism condition and
personal control condition compared to the negotiating with fate
condition, which was treated as the reference group.
The results supported our hypotheses (see Figure 4):
activating negotiating with fate led participants to more readily
identify behaviors as a contributing factor, compared to activating
fatalism [B = −0.45, SE = 0.23; t(135) = 1.91, p = 0.06,
d = 0.40], and activating personal control [B = −0.52, SE = 0.23;
t(135) = 2.26, p = 0.03, d = 0.47]. Using the same procedure
outlined for testing the effects of personal control vs. fatalism
in Experiment 3, we conducted an additional regression.
The findings indicated that activating fatalism did not lead
5Meyer and Taylor (1986) reported a 5-item scale, which consists of the 4-item
scale used in our study and one additional item (i.e., “I am too trusting”). Meyer
and Taylor (1986) designed the scale to specifically assess attributions in response
to being raped, but this particular behavior is too specific and unlikely to be
applicable in the wide range of constraining events that were recalled by our
participants (e.g., car accident, health problem, financial difficulties, divorce).
Therefore, this item was not included in the dependent measure in our study.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean agreement with behavioral attributions about constraining
event in Experiment 4, by condition. Error bars refer to standard errors of the
means.
participants to view behaviors as a contributing factor to a lesser
extent than activating personal control [B = −0.05, SE = 0.22;
t(90) = 0.24, p = 0.81, d = 0.10].
Discussion
Experiment 4 tested the context-specific advantages of believing
that one can negotiate with fate. The results showed that
activating negotiating with fate helped people identify ways in
which they could have potentially changed a recalled situation
through their actions, compared to activating personal control or
fatalism. These results supplemented the findings of Experiment
3 in two meaningful ways. First, these findings demonstrated
that negotiating with fate helped individuals move forward from
the event by identifying how changing their actions may help
them avoid a similar event in the future. Thus, negotiating with
fate lessened individuals’ tendencies to mull unproductively over
the event (Experiment 3), and also identified how they could
potentially prevent a similar event in the future. Second, these
findings more directly tested our contention that negotiating with
fate does not lead individuals to embrace its fatalistic component.
Whereas Experiment 3 demonstrated that negotiating with fate
lowered levels of rumination (which is commonly associated
with fatalism), Experiment 4 revealed that negotiating with fate
heightened the identification of personal actions in contributing
to the event, thereby highlighting the importance of personal
actions in altering the course of events while rejecting the notion
that the event was inevitable.
The results from Experiments 3 and 4 suggested that despite
the fatalistic component of the belief, believing in negotiating
with fate (Au et al., 2012, 2017) and experimentally activating
negotiating with fate had the same effect: it focused individuals’
attention on the changeable aspect of a constraining situation.
Experiments 5 and 6 extended upon these findings by exploring
how individuals may make the best of the event by through
different coping strategies, including positive reinterpretation
and acceptance (Experiment 5) and imbuing the event with
meaning (Experiment 6).
EXPERIMENT 5
As participants are recalling events from their past in our
experiments, strategies involving attempts to actively change the
circumstances surrounding that event may not be feasible. Thus,
Experiment 5 focused on positive reappraisal and acceptance.
In the past, these strategies were often examined in tandem:
positive reappraisal referred to the individuals’ choice to perceive
a constraining event in a more positive light, and acceptance
referred to individuals’ ability to acknowledge that the event has
occurred and cannot be changed. It is important to highlight
the difference between acceptance and helplessness: whereas
helplessness is characterized by passivity, acceptance requires
the individual actively work toward being comfortable with the
occurrence of the event (e.g., “I learn to live with it”). Thus,
the active nature of these two coping strategies may explain
why existing findings demonstrated that positive reappraisal and
acceptance of negative situations leads to positive psychological
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outcomes (for a review, see Morling and Evered, 2006). For
example, positive reappraisal of the situation helped parents
better cope with the birth of high risk infants (Affleck et al.,
1987), and acceptance of the situation was associated with
more adaptive coping among pregnant women (Morling et al.,
2003a,b). Therefore, these two can be considered to be adaptive
coping strategies.6
We hypothesized that exposing individuals to personal control
and fatalism would make it difficult for people to accept
and positively reappraise constraining events, but for different
reasons. The belief in personal control would propel individuals
to find ways to change the existing situation rather than to
accept the constraints as being unchangeable or finding ways
to positively reinterpret the situation (Rothbaum et al., 1982;
Morling et al., 2003a,b). The belief in fatalism was often
associated with a sense of helplessness (Cheng et al., 2013),
whereas acceptance and positive interpretation were strategies
that individuals actively use to interact with constraints that
they cannot change (Rothbaum et al., 1982). Given the link
between fatalism and passive resignation, exposing participants
to fatalism was unlikely to lead to greater acceptance and positive
reinterpretation of the constraining event.
In contrast, we predicted that the belief in negotiating with
fate would help individuals accept and positively reappraise a
constraining event. Au et al.’s (2012) findings suggested that
negotiating with fate helps individuals who face constraints by
actively coping with the situation. However, the nature of “active
coping” may differ between those who believe in negotiating with
fate versus those who believe in personal control. As described
above, those who believe in personal control are more likely to
find ways to change the environment; in contrast, we expected
those who believe in negotiating with fate to make the best out
of the constraints that have been imposed by the circumstances.
One such way was to accept that the circumstances cannot
be changed, and to also actively search for ways to positively
reappraise the situation.
To demonstrate that exposure to negotiating with fate
increases acceptance and positive reinterpretation but not
more traditionally passive strategies, we also included denial
and mental disengagement (i.e., self-distraction) as dependent
variables. If negotiating with fate heightensed the use of
denial and mental disengagement and acceptance and positive
reinterpretation, then may be negotiating with fate simply led
to the greater usage of different strategies regardless of its
level of passivity. Given that fatalism dictates that individuals
cannot alter events through their actions, we expected that
6Generally, research has shown that acceptance is an adaptive coping strategy (for
a review, see Morling and Evered, 2006), but some research has demonstrated that
acceptance is associated with depressive symptoms (e.g., Garnefski and Kraaij,
2006). Morling and Evered (2006) distinguished between two different kinds of
acceptance: acceptance by highlighting the hopelessness of the situation (which
is maladaptive) or adjusting the self to the unchangeable reality (which promotes
psychological adjustment). Garnefski and Kraaij’s (2006) measured acceptance in
terms of resignation, and therefore, the positive association between acceptance
and depressive symptoms is unsurprising. Instead, we measure acceptance in terms
of acknowledging the occurrence of the event rather than resignation, which is
associated with positive coping outcomes (Carver et al., 1989).
exposure to fatalism will increase the usage of denial and
mental disengagement.
Method
Participants
A sample of 194 United States residents (see Table 1
for demographics information) was recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.7 Participants were randomly assigned to either
the fatalism, personal control, or negotiate with fate condition.
Event Recall
Using the same instructions as Experiment 4, participants were
asked to recall an event in their past where they had no choice
but to accept the situation.
Manipulation
Participants exposed to either the belief in fatalism (α = 0.86),
personal control (α = 0.85), or negotiating with fate (α = 0.94)
using the same biased questionnaire manipulated used in
Experiments 3 and 4.
Dependent Measure
After the manipulation, we presented participants with four
subscales from the COPE measure (Carver et al., 1989): positive
reappraisal, acceptance, denial, and mental disengagement.
The positive reappraisal scale measured the extent to which
individuals could identify positive aspects of the constraining
event (e.g., “I try to see it in a different light and make it more
positive.”) The acceptance measure tapped the extent to which
individuals acknowledged the occurrence of the constraining
event (e.g., “I accept the reality that it has happened.”). The
denial measure tapped individuals’ refusal to believe that the
event had occurred (e.g., “I pretend that it never happened.”).
Finally, the mental disengagement measure assessed the extent
to which individuals used other aspects of their lives to distract
themselves from the problem at hand rather than facing the
situation (e.g., “I turn to work or other substitute activities to
take my mind off things.”) Participants were asked to rate the
extent to which they used these coping strategies in response
to the recalled event, on a 4-point scale (1 = Almost Never,
2 = Sometimes, 3 = Often, 4 = Almost Always). Each subscale
consisted of four items.
Results
There was a significant difference in mean agreement with the
biased scale across conditions [MFatalism = 3.58, MPersonalControl =
3.40, MNegotiateWithFate = 3.09; F(2,191) = 6.10, p = 0.003].
Therefore, we controlled for mean levels of agreement with
7The target sample size for Experiment 5 was also 100 participants per cell.
A survey seeking 300 United States residents was posted on www.mturk.com, and
299 participants completed the study before it expired. Non-attentive participants
were identified using the same criteria described in the previous four experiments.
Fifty-eight participants were excluded for failing the instructions check, 28
participants were excluded for eating or drinking, 3 were excluded for failing the
memory check. Consistent with Experiments 3 and 15 were excluded for listing
an event that occurred more than 10 years ago. One additional participant was
excluded for not completing the experimental manipulation.
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the biased scale items used in the manipulation in the
following analyses.
We averaged the four items of each subscale: positive
reappraisal (α = 0.82), acceptance (α = 0.83), denial (α =
0.72), and mental disengagement (α = 0.65). The means,
standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals of the
dependent measures are presented in Table 4. To test whether
levels of positive reappraisal, acceptance, denial, and mental
disengagement were different in the fatalism and personal control
condition compared to the negotiating with fate condition (our
reference group), we conducted a one regression for each
dependent measure.
With regards to adaptive coping, participants reported
significantly greater positive reappraisal of the event after
negotiating with fate was activated compared to activating
fatalism [B = −0.31, SE = 0.14, t(190) = 2.26, p = 0.03, d = 0.39],
and marginally greater positive reappraisal when compared to
activating personal control [B = −0.22, SE = 0.14, t(190) = −1.64,
p = 0.10, d = 0.28]. For acceptance, participants reported
marginally greater acceptance of the event after negotiating with
fate was activated compared to activating fatalism [B = −0.22,
SE = 0.11, t(190) = −1.81, p = 0.07, d = 0.10]. No differences
in acceptance were found between the activating negotiating
with fate and personal control [B = −0.02, SE = 0.11,
t(190) = −0.20, p = 0.84].
With regards to passive strategies, for denial, no significant
effects were found when we compared activating negotiating with
fate to activating fatalism [B = −0.06, SE = 0.09, t(190) = −0.61,
p = 0.54] or activating personal control [B = 0.05, SE = 0.09,
t(190) = 0.63, p = 0.53]. Similarly, for mental disengagement,
no significant effects were found when we compared activating
negotiating with fate to activating fatalism [B = −0.00, SE = 0.11,
t(190) = −0.08, p = 0.93] or activating personal control [B = 0.05,
SE = 0.11, t(190) = 0.45, p = 0.65].
Using the same procedure outlined for testing the effects
of personal control vs. fatalism in Experiments 3 and 4, we
conducted additional regressions for each of the dependent
variables. The findings indicated that activating personal control
did not lead to any differences on the four dependent variables
compared to activating fatalism {positive reappraisal [B = −0.09,
SE = 0.14, t(127) = 0.62, p = 0.53]; acceptance [B = −0.20,
SE = 0.11, t(127) = 1.79, p = 0.08]; denial [B = 0.13, SE = 0.09,
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FIGURE 5 | Mean positive reappraisal and acceptance of constraining event
in Experiment 5, by condition. Error bars refer to standard errors of the means.
t(127) = 1.45, p = 0.15]; or mental disengagement [B = 0.07,
SE = 0.11, t(127) = 0.62, p = 0.54]; see Figure 5}.
Discussion
Experiment 5 explored whether negotiating with fate helped
people to move forward from the event through acceptance
and positive reappraisal, two strategies that have been identified
as adaptive when managing circumstances that are perceived
as unchangeable. The results showed that activating this belief
led participants to positively reinterpret the constraining event
and accept that it has happened to a greater extent, when
compared activating fatalism. To demonstrate that negotiating
with fate does not simply increase the use of strategies regardless
of passivity, our findings showed that activating negotiating
with fate did not lead to the greater use of denial and
mental disengagement. Surprisingly, exposure to fatalism did
not increase the use of either denial or mental disengagement
strategies. It may be possible that individuals who believe in
fate use other passive strategies that we did not capture in the
current studies.
In sum, given that there are no significant differences
between activating fatalism and activating personal control, we
proposed that acknowledging the need to make the best out of
unchangeable constraints helped individuals find ways to see a
constraining event more positively, and accepting it as part of
one’s life course. Next, we explored one possible downstream
consequence of positive reappraising the constraining event:
finding meaning in the event by viewing it as an important part
of their life story.
EXPERIMENT 6
In Experiment 5, we found that activating negotiating with fate
spontaneously led to higher levels of positive reappraisal. In
Experiment 6, we investigated whether requiring individuals to
actively search for a silver lining will eliminate the beneficial
effects of negotiating with fate. If yes, it would suggest that the
adaptive functions of negotiating with fate can be mimicked by
introducing an intervention that simply requires individuals to
reflect on positive consequences of the constraining event. Such
findings would call into question the usefulness of the belief
in negotiating with fate. In contrast, if we observed differences
on the dependent measure, we would be able to conclude that
negotiating with fate has advantages that extend beyond simply
positively reappraising the event. The dependent measure in
Experiment 6 explored one downstream consequence of positive
reappraisals: the search for meaning. When individuals face
situations that they have no choice but to face, they are likely
to search for meaning behind this event. They are likely to ask:
why did this event happen to me and what purpose does it
serve? The search for meaning can be characterized as a process,
which evolves as individuals are exposed to different perspectives
on the intended consequence of the event for the individual.
Generally, research has shown that the ability to identify silver
linings of a stressful event allows people to integrate the event into
their identity, and consequently, giving the experience a purpose
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(McAdams et al., 2001) and fostering adjustment (Davis et al.,
1998). It is important to note that whereas positive reappraisal
focuses solely on the positive consequences this event on their
lives (e.g., “this event made me appreciate my loved ones more”),
the search for meaning assess whether individuals integrated this
event into their life history (e.g., “This event has shaped who I
have become”), and identities (e.g., “this event shaped me into
who I am today”).
The search for purpose generally helps individuals identify
ways that the experience helped them become was an important
part of their lives and defined who they are today. Thus, we
reasoned that neither exposure to fatalism nor personal control
will help individuals find greater meaning in the event, but for
different reasons. From the fatalistic perspective, events occur
simply because it is how fate has decreed it; these experiences
do not serve any purpose for the individual. Therefore, it would
be unlikely for a positive appraisal exercise to imbue greater
meaning of a constraining event after activating fatalism. From
the personal control perspective, events that befall an individual
are solely determined by the self, and constraining events
experiences threaten the potency of one’s ability to direct life
events. This incongruence would make it difficult for individuals
to incorporate these events into their identities, even after
attempting to find a silver lining.
Importantly, we reasoned that engaging in positive
interpretation of a constraining event would be most beneficial
among those exposed to negotiating with fate. From this
perspective, individuals acknowledge the need to make the best
out of unchangeable constraining circumstances. Therefore,
finding a silver lining allows individuals to identify lessons
learned through dealing with these situations, making it easier
for them to see how these events shaped them into who they
are today.
Method
Participants
A sample of 158 United States residents (see Table 1
for demographic information) was recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk.8 Participants were randomly assigned either to
the negotiating with fate, fatalism or personal control condition.
Measures and Procedures
Using the same instructions as previous experiments, participants
were asked to recall an event in their past where they
had no choice but to accept the situation. Participants were
then randomly exposed to one of the biased questionnaires
from Experiments 3–5 (αFatalism = 0.79; αPersonalControl = 0.83;
αNegotiatingWithFate = 0.92). Next, participants were further asked
to reflect and think of a silver lining (i.e., something positive)
8The target sample size for Experiment 6 was also 100 participants per cell.
A survey seeking 300 United States residents was posted on www.mturk.com, and
299 participants completed the study before it expired. Non-attentive participants
were identified using the same criteria described in the previous five experiments.
Eighty-six participants were excluded for failing the instructions check, 24
participants were excluded for eating or drinking, and 5 were excluded for failing
the memory check. Consistent with Experiments 3, 5, and 26 were excluded for
listing an event that occurred more than 10 years ago.
that they can derive from the event. Participants also answered
the following question, “Did thinking of a silver lining help you
to see the negative event in a more positive light?” on a 9-point
scale (1 = it made it extremely difficult to 9 = it made it extremely
easy). This item was used as a covariate because we wanted
to investigate whether the simple act of asking participants to
search for a silver lining was sufficient to eliminate the beneficial
effects of negotiating with fate. From a theoretical perspective, we
wanted to test whether the mere completion of this activity was
sufficient to mimic the effects of negotiating with fate, regardless
of how helpful the participant found this exercise to be. From a
statistical perspective, participants’ helpfulness ratings correlated
significantly with meaning (r = 0.33, p < 0.001), and thus, we
needed to control for individual differences in the perceived
helpfulness of the task. There were no significant differences in
ratings of helpfulness across groups, F(3,154) = 0.944, p = 0.42.
Dependent Measure
Participants completed an 11-item scale about the
meaningfulness of the event. The measure included two
items of meaningfulness (“This event made me who I am
today,” and “This event gave meaning to my life.”) from
Kray et al. (2010), and additional items generated along these
themes (e.g., “This event played a meaningful role in my life.”).
Participants rated their agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree).
Results
Although there were no mean differences in agreement with
the control belief scale across conditions [MFatalism = 3.53,
MPersonalControl = 3.28, MNegotiateWithFate = 3.28; F(2, 155) = 1.82,
p = 0.16], mean levels of agreement to biased scale items were
included as covariates to maintain consistency (as we did in
Experiments 3–5). Given the positive correlation between the
helpfulness rating and ascribed meaningfulness of the event,
helpfulness ratings were also included in the regression analyses
as a covariate, in the regressions reported below.
We first averaged the 11 items of the meaningfulness scale
(α = 0.93). The means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence
intervals of the dependent variable are presented in Table 4.
We then tested whether levels of ascribed meaningfulness of
the event were different in the fatalism condition and personal
control condition compared to the negotiating with fate condition,
which was treated as the reference group. These analyses revealed
that participants ascribed greater meaning to the event after
negotiating with fate was activated compared to activating
fatalism [B = −0.56, SE = 0.28, t(153) = 1.97, p = 0.05, d = 0.38].
No significant difference in ascribed meaningfulness was found
between activating negotiating with fate compared to activating
personal control [B = −0.37, SE = 0.27, t(153) = 1.33, p = 0.19,
d = 0.26]. Using the same procedure outlined for testing the
effects of personal control vs. fatalism in Experiments 3–5, we
conducted additional regressions for each of the dependent
variables. The findings indicated that activating fatalism did
not lead to different levels of ascribed meaning compared to
activating personal control [B = 0.20, SE = 0.28, t(104) = 0.70,
p = 0.49, d = 0.13; see Figure 6].
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Discussion
As hypothesized, Experiment 6 demonstrated that after
attempting to positively reappraise a constraining event
that individuals had no choice but to face, activating
negotiating with fate (compared to activating fatalism)
led people to ascribe greater meaning to the event. These
findings indicated that acknowledging that one has to
make the best out of unchangeable circumstances can help
individuals incorporate experiences with constraints into their
identities, making these experiences an important part of
who they are today.
Furthermore, Experiment 5 demonstrated that negotiating
with fate led to spontaneous positive reinterpretation of the
constraining event. The results from Experiment 6 demonstrated
even when individuals were required to search for a positive
consequence of the constraining event, the unique advantages
of positive reinterpretation after activating negotiating with fate
cannot be reaped after activating fatalism. Interestingly, the
effect of the silver lining task on the ascription of meaning
for those exposed to personal control was midway between
negotiating with fate and fatalism, and was not significantly
different from either. This finding is consistent with those
from Experiments 3 and 5 – whereas activating negotiating
with fate consistently produces stronger advantages for coping,
activating personal control did not lead to different levels
of coping compared to negotiating with fate or fatalism.
These results then lead us to two questions: (1) Is activating
negotiable fate more beneficial than activating personal control
for helping individuals move forward from the event? And (2)
Is activating personal control more beneficial than activating
fatalism for helping individuals move forward from the event?
To this end, we turn to a meta-analysis conducted on
our experiments.
META-ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS
BETWEEN ACTIVATING NEGOTIATING
WITH FATE AND PERSONAL CONTROL
Experiments 3–6 demonstrated that, compared to activating
fatalism, activating negotiating with fate helped individuals
ruminate less (Experiment 3), identify changeable contributory
factors to explain the constraining event (Experiment 4), use
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FIGURE 6 | Mean meaningfulness of constraining event in Experiment 6, by
condition. Error bars refer to standard errors of the means.
positive reappraisal and acceptance strategies (Experiment 5),
and ascribe more meaning to the event (Experiment 6). However,
does believing that one can negotiate with fate help people
cope with constraining events significantly better than personal
control? Activating negotiating with fate was seen as more
beneficial than activating personal control only in Experiment
4, in which those exposed to negotiating with fate were
more likely to identify their behaviors as having contributed
to the event. Activating personal control did not differ from
activating negotiating with fate in the other experiments.
Thus, to address this question, we conducted a meta-analysis
on the results of Experiments 3–6. To this end, we used
the Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals [“ESCI for
Macintosh (Excel© 2011)” worksheet]9 for computing meta-
analyses accompanying Cumming (2012). For each study, we
first saved the residuals after controlling for any covariates. We
included the primary dependent measure from each experiment:
rumination (Experiment 3), behavioral attributions (Experiment
4), positive reappraisal (Experiment 5), and sense of meaning
(Experiment 6), with all variables were recoded such that higher
numbers indicate a more adaptive response to the constraining
event. We ran a random-effects meta-analysis model assuming
that the effect size of the difference between conditions are likely
to vary across the different dependent measures.
When comparing activating negotiating with fate against
activating fatalism, the estimated meta-analytic effect size of
the difference between the two (weighted by sample size) was
significant, with estimated effect size of difference between group
means (see Cumming, 2012) ES = 0.2844, z = 3.949, p = 0.0001,
var(ES) = 0.0052, 95% CI[0.1432, 0.4255]. The estimated
heterogeneity in effect sizes across studies was non-significant,
Q(df = 3) = 1.6616, p = 0.65. When comparing activating
negotiating with fate against activating personal control, the
mean meta-analytic effect size of difference between the two was
also significant, ES = 0.2022, z = 2.346, p = 0.019, var(ES) = 0.0074,
95% CI[0.0333, 0.3712]. The estimated heterogeneity in effect
sizes across studies was non-significant, Q(df = 3) = 3.8017,
p = 0.28.
In contrast, the mean meta-analytic effect size of difference
between fatalism and personal control was non-significant,
ES = −0.0977, z = 1.344, p = 0.179, var(ES) = 0.00528,
95% CI[−0.2401, 0.0448]. The estimated heterogeneity
in effect sizes across studies was again non-significant,
Q(df = 3) = 1.1754, p = 0.76.
Discussion
Importantly, the meta-analyses showed that activating the
belief in negotiating with fate provided more context-specific
advantages for moving forward from a constraining event,
compared to either the activation of fatalism or personal control.
Given its description, negotiating with fate could be mistaken as
an intermediate construct that represents the “middle ground” on
a continuum, with believing in fatalism on one end and personal
9Retrieved from http://www.latrobe.edu.au/psy/research/cognitive-and-
developmental-psychology/esci, version dated July 4, 2011, downloaded on
8 February, 2014.
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control on the other. A “middle ground” construct of this nature
could capture two disparate beliefs: the lack of belief in either
(i.e., disbelief in either fatalism or personal control) or a belief in
both (i.e., believing in both fatalism and personal to some extent).
Regardless of its constitution, one would expect a middle ground
construct to produce effects that fall consistently between those
of fatalism and personal control.
Instead, the meta-analytic findings suggest that negotiating
with fate was associated with a divergent pattern of results when
compared to fatalism and personal control, whereas activating
fatalism and personal control do not significantly differ from
each other in terms of their effects on responses to the recalled
constraining situations. These findings provide support for the
way we conceptualize negotiating with fate as prescribing specific
roles for fate and personal control, a belief that cannot be
adequately captured as simply a combination of fatalism and
personal control.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The belief in negotiating with fate has been found to be popular
and beneficial in the Chinese cultural context (Au et al., 2011,
2012, 2017). The present series of six experiments explored
the context-specific applicability and advantages of the belief in
negotiating with fate beyond the Chinese cultural context. Our
results provided support for Chiu and Hong’s (2005) theory
that the advantages of cultural knowledge can extend beyond
its originators, and that the recruitment and usage of such
knowledge is dependent on the situational experiences of the
individual. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that: (1) the
experiences of constraints activate a belief that one can negotiate
with fate, which refers to acknowledging that external factors
impose a boundary within which individuals can use their
personal actions to shape outcomes (the activation hypothesis);
and (2) when individuals face constraints in their lives, this
belief is beneficial for helping them move forward from manage
constraining life events that they had no choice but to fate
(the context-specific advantages hypothesis). The meta-analysis
of Experiments 3–6 indicated that overall, negotiating with fate
provides greater context-specific advantages than fatalism or
personal control alone.
Theoretical Implications
Implications for Studying Cultural Knowledge as a
Universal Cognitive Toolbox
Cheng et al. (2013) conducted an extensive literature review
on the detrimental effects of believing that external factors
determine personal outcomes. The overarching conclusion was
that such beliefs have a less detrimental effect on mental health
among Easterners (e.g., Chinese) compared to Westerners (e.g.,
US Americans). The authors cited negotiating with fate as a
hybrid belief in fate and personal control that could potentially
explain this cultural difference. Indeed, Au et al. (2012) showed
that negotiating with fate was stronger among the Chinese
participants and associated with markers of positive (rather than
negative) psychological functioning.
Extending these findings, we proposed that the belief that one
can negotiate with fate can be similarly popular and beneficial
among individuals from the West. Although negotiating with
fate originated from collective Chinese wisdom, we followed
Chiu and Hong’s (2005) approach to cultural knowledge and we
argue for its universal applicability. Triangulating environmental
and historical factors illuminated why different cultural practices
evolved, and the purpose served by different cultural practices
and beliefs (Gelfand et al., 2011). Building on past work
identifying perceived constraints as the mediator for the cultural
difference in the belief that one can negotiate with fate (Au
et al., 2012), the current research investigated its causal impact
when people are faced with constraints. The results from our
current studies provided support for the argument that cultural
beliefs have universal applicability when factors engendering
these beliefs are salient in other cultures. Thus, even among
individuals who were not embedded within the culture from
which a belief originated, this belief can still be flexibly recruited
and used to individuals’ advantage.
Implications for Beliefs in Fate
The mere mention of “believing in fate” may conjure up
images of individuals who have lost all hope for shaping
their lives. Indeed, past research tended to view fatalistic
beliefs, defined as viewing fate as the sole determinant of
outcomes, as largely irrational and maladaptive (Mayo et al.,
2001; Dettenborn et al., 2004). However, the construct of
negotiating with fate suggested that acknowledging fate’s role
in determining outcomes does not necessarily render personal
actions irrelevant. Thus far, research on negotiating with fate
identified two ways in which individuals’ actions can still make
a difference despite the impact of external factors. First, the
current studies explored the impact of constraints, defined as
working with the boundaries that are imposed by external
factors. In the context of constraints, individuals’ personal
actions still matter despite the impact of external factors.
Specifically, individuals’ outcomes depended on whether they
are able to make the best out of the situation they are
given. Second, Au et al.’s (2017) studies explored the context
of uncertainty, defined as the unpredictability of a positive
outcome. For example, winning the lottery is unpredictable
because individuals do not know the winning numbers ahead
of purchasing one. Therefore, whether individuals’ actions (e.g.,
buying a lottery ticket) will lead to a positive outcome is
unknown, but the individual’s non-action (e.g., not buying
a lottery ticket) will guarantee failure. In this context, an
individual’s actions are important for preventing failure, even if
these actions do not guarantee success. Distinguishing between
qualitatively different experiences with external factors has
important implications for advancing our understanding of
how individuals remain resilient. We proposed that sustained
interaction with unyielding external factors that leave no room
for personal actions to alter one’s life course would engender a
belief in fatalism. A nuanced examination of divergent effects
of external factors will help the field refine its theories and
hypotheses regarding the beliefs that foster adaptive coping under
a wider range of conditions.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Investigating How Negotiating With Fate Increases
Positive Appraisals
In Experiment 5, the results suggested that activating negotiating
with fate increased levels of positive appraisal. However,
surprisingly, those exposed to negotiable fate in Experiment 6
did not rate the generated silver lining as being more helpful
than those exposed to fatalism or personal control. Future studies
may wish to unpack the nature of this effect. For example, the
instructions for Experiment 6 only asked participants to generate
one silver lining and rate the helpfulness of that particular silver
lining. This leaves open the possibility that those exposed to
negotiating with fate were better able to positively reappraise the
event (in Experiment 5) because they spontaneously generated
more than one silver lining, and not because they found just
one silver lining more helpful. Perhaps future studies can require
participants to generate as many silver linings as possible, and
explore whether the number of silver linings mediates the
relationship between activating negotiating with fate and positive
reappraisal or meaningfulness of the event.
Investigating How Activating Different Beliefs Shape
Other Coping Strategies
In Experiment 5, we asked participants the frequency with which
they used four types of coping strategies. Future research may
wish to simply ask individuals who they tended to cope with the
past event in an open-ended manner, and thus, be able to capture
differences in coping strategies beyond the ones that we have
already included.
Generalizability Across Situations of Constraints
In our experiments, we asked participants to recall an event in
their lives in which they had no choice but to face a particular
situation, thus focusing on specific situations of constraints.
Future studies can consider exploring other operationalizations
of constraints, including socio-economic status (Snibbe and
Markus, 2005), lack of residential mobility (e.g., Oishi, 2010;
Oishi et al., 2012; Oishi et al., 2007a,b), and readiness of one’s
society to punish deviance (i.e., tightness vs. looseness; Gelfand
et al., 2011). These future avenues of research also offer a
chance to unpack the overlap between negotiating with fate and
personal control. Perhaps in managing unchanging structural
and institutional constraints, both beliefs would lead individuals
to active (rather than passive) in goal attainment attempts.
However, those who believe in negotiable fate may be more likely
to choose and find strategies that allow them to attain their goals
without upending the constraints – a hypothesis consistent with
acknowledging that fate has imposed unchangeable boundaries,
but individuals can do the best that they can within these
limitations to achieve desired outcomes. In contrast, those who
believe in personal control may be more likely to attain goals
by instigating changes that will remove the constraints to bring
about desired outcomes. Thus, a more nuanced investigation into
how goal pursuit in the face of constraints may shed greater
light onto the differences between negotiating with fate and
personal control.
Conclusion
Divergent cultural landscapes foster collective wisdom that
enables individuals to survive and thrive in that particular
context. Although fate tends to be less prevalent in the West,
our research showed that US Americans flexibly recruited a belief
rooted in Chinese collective wisdom –negotiating with fate– to
help them navigate constraints. Thus, when external factors loom
large, individuals have a tendency to work with these factors
rather than surrender to them. By identifying factors that shape
fate beliefs, we highlighted how cultural beliefs can have pan-
cultural implications.
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